

- PABLO DOPICO, *A rose by any other name: more supervaluation-style truth without supervaluations.*

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One of the main shortcomings of Saul Kripke's fixed-point semantics based on the Strong Kleene logic, presented for the first time in [1], is that it leaves many logical truths out of the extension of the truth predicate. Thus, as an alternative, Kripke suggests to construct the fixed-point models on the basis of the supervaluationist semantics advanced by van Fraassen [2]. What obtains is a supervaluationist fixed-point semantics that has arguably constituted one of the most popular solutions to the paradoxes of self-reference.

However, the supervaluationist fixed-point theory of truth is not free from objections. The final picture yields a non-compositional theory of truth whose evaluation scheme is highly intransparent and that cannot be \mathbb{N} -categorically axiomatized [3] like the Kripke-Strong Kleene can. For this reason, Johannes Stern [4] has recently advanced a theory (labelled **SSK**) that also meets the goal of the Kripkean supervaluationist theory (i.e., to include all first-order logical truths) while allegedly accounting for the failure of compositionality, and allowing for a \mathbb{N} -categorical axiomatization.

Our main contribution in this paper is to show that **SSK** is strikingly similar to a rather understudied theory: Vann McGee's theory of definite truth as presented in [5]. In the first part, we present both theories and prove that McGee's original theory coincides with the minimal fixed point of Stern's theory, modulo a suitable restriction of the language of the former. In the second part, we show how to generalise McGee's theory to any starting inductive set, and prove once again that these theories *à la* McGee coincide with Stern's **SSK** fixed points. In sum, we could say that McGee's theory is an alternative way of obtaining supervaluation-style truth without supervaluations.

[1] SAUL KRIPKE, *Outline of a theory of truth*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 72 (1975), no. 19, pp. 690–716.

[2] BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN, *Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic.*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 63 (1966), no. 17, pp. 481–495.

[3] MARTIN FISCHER, VOLKER HALBACH, JÖNNE KRIENER, AND JOHANNES STERN, *Axiomatizing semantic theories of truth?*, *The Review of Symbolic Logic*, vol. 8 (2015), no. 2, pp. 257–278.

[4] JOHANNES STERN, *Supervaluation-style truth without supervaluations*, *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, vol. 47 (2018), no. 5, pp. 817–850.

[5] VANN MCGEE, *Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox*, Hackett Pub. Co., 1991.