▸ GUIDO GHERARDI, AND EUGENIO ORLANDELLI, *Logics of super-strict implications.*
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C.I. Lewis' [3] strict implication ($\dashv\!\!\exists$) is a stregthening of material implication ($\supset$) that avoids its paradoxes—$\neg B \supset (B \supset A)$ and $A \supset (B \supset A)$. It is meant to provide a formal explication of entailment-related uses of implication. Connexivists [4] and relevantists [1] have argued that the paradoxes of strict implication—$\bot \dashv\!\!\exists\ A$ and $B \dashv\!\!\exists\ \top$—are a reason to discard $\dashv\!\!\exists$ and they have proposed alternative implications that are paradox-free. One limitation of their proposals is that they involve a major departure from classical logic.

Super-strict implication ($\rhd$) strengthens $\dashv\!\!\exists$ in order to avoids its paradoxes: $A \rhd B$ is true whenever $A \supset B$ is necessary and A is possible, see [2]. In this way we obtain a paradox-free implication that is compatible with classical logic. This talk provides some motivations for $\rhd$ and studies proof-systems for some important logics of $\rhd$.

[1] A.R. Anderson and N.D. Belnap, ***Entailment. The Logic of Relevance and Necessity. Vol. 1***, Princeton University Press, 1975 .

[2] G. Gherardi and E. Orlandelli, *Super-strict implications*, ***Bulletin of the Section of Logic***, vol. 50 (2021), no. 1, pp. 1–34.

[3] C.I. Lewis and C.H. Langford, ***Symbolic Logic***, Century Co, 1932.

[4] E.J. Nelson, *Intensional relations*, ***Mind***, vol. (1930), no. 156, pp. 440–453.