

- DAVIDE SUTTO, *Potentialist set theory: New paths and open questions*.  
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In the last ten years potentialist set theory has emerged as one of the most lively trends in the philosophy of set theory. Remarkably, a modal account of sets has been developed in two different ways, the first inspired by the work of Charles Parsons and the second dating back to Hilary Putnam and Geoffrey Hellman. The aim of the paper is to present these two approaches through two groups of questions, with the aim of outlining the state of the art while, at the same time, sketching the new paths and challenges soon-to-be-faced by a potentialist account of sets.

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