

- WEI ZHU, *A Formal Investigation on Belief, Non-belief and Suspension*. Department of Philosophy, University of Regensburg, Universitätsstraße 31, Germany. E-mail: [weizhu.logica@gmail.com](mailto:weizhu.logica@gmail.com).

The discussions on truth, belief, disbelief, suspension, and their relationships to each other have been abundant in different philosophical fields, such as epistemology, truth theory, and logic. Our aim here is to discuss such notions within belief revision theory, and to point out some so far possibly unnoticed implications. We will focus on eight possible sentences about belief co., and specify our concern and separate the eight sentences into two groups, i.e. (Group1), consisting of beliefs/disbeliefs, and (Group2), consisting of non-beliefs/non-disbeliefs. Besides, we will formulate five assumptions, (A.1–A.5), and make some preliminary observation about these assumptions by means of a confrontation with [2] and [3]. Specifically, we will discuss some of our intuitive understandings of suspension, and formulate them in a group, i.e. (Group3), which consists of three kinds of belief suspension. Meanwhile, we will put forth two hypotheses, i.e. (H.S1–H.S2) about (Group3). Following, we will propose to re-frame them within the frameworks of ranking theory. In the last section, besides providing some final remarks, we will outline an open question about belief suspension.

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